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Throughout the 1980s, the Tunisian economy has faced a deterioration of 
its external and internal deficits.  The reason behind such deterioration may 
be partly attributed to the rapid consumption growth and to the 
subsidization of consumer prices which has been the main cause of the 
budgetary deficit.  This situation led the government to adopt the structural 
adjustment plan proposed by the International Monetary Fund in 1986.   
This plan involved reforms aimed at the restructuring of the economy so as 
to enhance the traded goods sector, the rehabilitation of market 
mechanisms and the encouragement of private initiatives.  These objectives 
were to be accomplished partly through the liberalization of the price 
system and through a fiscal reform with mainly the institution of the value 
added tax in July 1988.  The goal of these reforms was to promote a 
sustainable economic growth without internal and external deficit 
deterioration.  Nevertheless, macro-economic adjustment programs have 
often raised anxiety concerning their effects on poor population.  The 
welfare reforms’ effects on poor population have then to be evaluated. It is 
necessary to analyze the microeconomic implications of these 
macroeconomic reforms to be able to target correctly those social 
categories that need protection and identify the social measures that would 
have to accompany such reforms.  
The aim of this paper is to propose a methodology, consistent with 
the consumer theory, that allows the evaluation of the implications of the 
price system reforms on the poor population’s welfare.  This issue poses an 
identification and a measure problem.   It also delves on the poverty line 
estimation, using a utilitarian approach and the definition of the poor 
population welfare measures, that allow the assessment of social loss 
subsequent to the presence of poor people having an income level inferior 
to the poverty line.  Welfare measures advocated in this paper are based on 
King’s approach (1983).  This approach presents the advantage of 180    Building and Sustaining the Capacity for Social Policy Reforms 
considering the households’ reaction to price system reforms.  It is based 
on the estimation of a demand system that has to respect economic 
consumer axioms.  A methodology is presented allowing to estimate 
parameters of a flexible demand  system, as the QAIDS system of Banks et 
al. (1993).  The parameters estimation of this model have been made 
possible using the National Statistic Institute households’ budget and 
consumption survey of 1990.  The simulation of a price system reform’s 
effects on the poor population and the identification of target groups is 
addressed. Within the framework of this section, a hypothetical reform is 
considered consisting of eliminating the budget devoted to food subsidies.  
The impact of this reform on the poor population welfare is examined and 
the possibility of reallocating a part of this budget to better tackle the 
poverty issue in Tunisia.  Socio-demographic indicators are defined  which 
are likely to lead to a better targeting of the poor populations.  Such 
targeting  would make it possible to reduce public expenditures and also to 
improve the well-being of these target groups. 
 
 
Poor Population Welfare 
 
The economic literature dealing with poor population welfare measures has 
considerably increased since the work done by Sen (1976).  According to Sen, 
poverty analysis requires the solving of  two problems, namely that of   
identification and that of aggregation.  The identification problem consists in 
being able to spot the poor out of the total population with the definition of a 
poverty line (PL). It is also necessary to identify the sensitivity of the PL to 
price system reforms to establish a relationship between structural adjustment 
reforms and their microeconomic effects. The aggregation problem consists in 
finding a means through which the distribution of the individual well-being is 
moved  to an aggregated poverty measure.  This measure could be interpreted 
as being the social loss due to the presence of individuals having an income 
level lower than the PL. It would be preferable to see that  this measure is 
consistent with certain axioms developed in the literature studying this 
subject. 
 
The Identification Problem 
 
The identification of the poor population, with the estimation of the PL, is a 
necessary step in analyzing the adjustment reforms on the well-being of the 
poor population.  One of the methods commonly used consists in estimating 
this PL on the basis of needs in food energy (Greer and Thorbecke, 1986 ; 
Charmes, 1990).  The shortcoming of this approach is that it does not account 181      A Welfare Analysis of the Price System Reforms  
for all the needs created by  society.  A better alternative would be to derive 
the PL from the consumer theory  (Ravallion, 1996). 
The determination of the PL is rarely formulated in utilitarian terms.  
In theory, a utilitarian approach should enable the estimation of the  PL 
corresponding to a minimum utility level, or again to an indifference curve 
that delimits the welfare level of a poor individual from the welfare level of a 
non-poor individual.  The compensated expenditure function would allow 
therefore to determine for any given price system, the minimum expenditure 
level required to reach this indifference curve.   As an example, the individual 
welfare may be represented by the Stone-Geary utility function 
Ux x x ii
i
i () ( ) =− ∏
σ , where xi is the quantity consumed of good i, σ i is a 
positive parameter and xi  may be interpreted as some minimum 
consumption of good i; the maximization of this utility function subject to 
budgetary constraint  px Y ii
i
= ∑ , where pi is the price of good i and Y is the 
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where di
h is the per equivalent adult  expenditure of good i by household h 
having a per equivalent  adult income level, Y
h, and zi is the constant of the 
model that indicates the minimum per equivalent adult expenditure of good i
3 
Bourguignon and  Field (1997) have underlined that when using this model to 
study the consumption behavior, it has to be assumed that all individuals 
having an income level below the minimum, zp x ii
i
= ∑ , required to buy 
the minimum bundle (x ), may be considered as being poor.  Nevertheless, 
the definition of the poverty as compared to a reference bundle (x ) is too 
restrictive especially if a utilitarian approach is adopted for the estimation of 
the PL.
4   
A better approach is to choose another demand system that is more 
flexible. If e(p,U) denotes the expenditure function which defines the 
minimum expenditure necessary to attain a specific utility level U at given 
price system p, a first order approximation to any demand system that satisfies 
axioms of the consumer theory, can be given by the PIGLOG class definite: 
 
() () () ln ( , ) ( )ln ( ) ln ( ) epU U zp U gp =− + 1
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  Save a few exceptions, the utility level U lies between 0 (the 
subsistance level) and 1 (the bliss level).
5  So the functions z(p) and g(p) can 
be regarded as the costs of subsistance (or the PL) and bliss, respectively. For 
the AIDS  demand system of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) or QAIDS of 
Banks at al. (1993), the z(p) function takes the following form: 
 











  The AIDS or QAIDS demand system estimation does not allow to 
deduce a PL if a value of ω 0
6  is not first estimated.  Since ω 0 can be 
interpreted as the PL if all prices are equal to 1, an arbitrary specification of 
this value can lead only to an arbitrary estimation of the PL . Thus, the 
recommendation made by Banks et al. (1993)  is followed which suggests 
specifying a plausible interval for this parameter.  This allows the avoidance 
of controversies concerning the estimation of the PL since the analysis of the 
price system reforms on the poor population will be made using a large   
interval of PLs.  To do this, Atkinson’s stochastic dominance conditions 
(1987) is used to evaluate the reforms impact on the welfare distribution of 
poor population with the use of a large interval of PLs.  
 
The Aggregation Problem  
 
To solve the aggregation problem, a mapping from the individual welfare 
distribution into a scalar poverty measure is required.  The poverty measure 
which meets analysis needs must satisfy axioms of monotonicity, transfer, 
transfer-sensibility and decomposability.
7 
•  The Monotonicity Axiom - A reduction of the poor’s income must 
increase the poverty measure, all  things being equal. 
•  The Transfer Axiom - An income transfer from a poor individual to a 
less one must increase the poverty measure, all things being equal. 
•  The Transfer-Sensibility Axiom - For any positive integer ρ  and any 
pair of poor individuals h and j, if  j > h, then  ∆Ρ
h, h+ρ  > ∆Ρ
j, j+ρ  where 
∆Ρ
h, h+ρ  is the increase in poverty measure due to an income transfer 
from the hth poor to the (h+ρ )th poor. 
•  The Decomposability Axiom - Let Y 
f be a vector of incomes obtained 
from Y by changing the incomes in subgroup c from Yc to Yc
f, where 
the total number of households in subgroup c (Hc) is unchanged.  If Yc
f 
has more poverty than Yc , then Y 
f must also have a higher level of 183      A Welfare Analysis of the Price System Reforms  
poverty than Y. The class of poverty measures proposed by Foster et al. 
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(4)  
 
where  z and Y are as defined above, H ( Hp) is the total number of 
households (poor households), n
h is the size of household h and α  may be 
considered as a measure of poverty aversion: a larger α  gives greater 
emphasis to the poorest poor.  As α  becomes very large, Ρ α  approaches a 
Rawlsian measure which considers only the poorest households’ welfare.  
The measure Ρ 0 is known as the headcount ratio, while Ρ 1 is a normalized 
average gap measure which is a good poverty measure only if all the poor 
have the same income.
8   The poverty measure Ρ α  satisfies the monotonicity 
axiom for α  > 0, the transfer axiom for α  > 1, the transfer sensitivity axiom 
for α  > 2 and always the decomposability axiom.
9   
The decomposition of poverty measure is very useful since 
economic policies may have different impact on subgroups that compose  
the poor population.  Also, a precise knowledge of the reforms’ impact 
envisaged on the different subgroups will allow to identify better the most 
vulnerable social groups necessary to protect and social measures required 
that have to be inherent to these reforms.  Thus, if C is considered to be 
mutually exclusive subgroups, if Ρ c,  α  is the poverty measure in the 
subgroup c and if fc represents the weight of the subgroup c in the total 
population, then the measure Ρ α  may be decomposed as follows:  
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To compare the levels of a household’s welfare when it faces 
different price systems, it is equally necessary to define a welfare measure 
to each poor household.  This measure may be presented in terms of values 
of the equivalent income function as defined by King (1983).  For a given 
budget constraint (p, Y), equivalent income is defined as the income level 
which allows, at the reference price system p
r, the same utility level as can 
be reached under the given budget constraint: 
 
Vp Y Vp Y
r
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where V is the indirect utility function and p is the price system.  Notice 
that since p
r is fixed across all households, Ye is an exact monetary metric 
of actual utility Vp Y (,)  because Ye is an increasing monotonic 
transformation of V(.).  Indeed, inverting the indirect utility function, 
equivalent income is obtained in terms of the expenditure function: 
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where e(.) is the expenditure function and ye(.) is the equivalent income 
function. The properties of the equivalent income function are derived from 
the properties of indirect utility and expenditure functions.  Also, ye(.) is 
increasing in p
r and Y, decreasing in p, homogeneous of degree 1 in p
r and , 
homogeneous of degree 0 in (p, Y). 
Suppose that the reference price system p
r is equal to the actual 
price system p
a , the distribution of equivalent income per equivalent adult 
in the actual situation (Ye
a) is equal to the actual distribution of the income 
Y: 
 
Yy p p Y Y e
a
e
aa == (,, )       (8)  
 
Suppose that the reform consists in substituting the price post-
reform system p
p to the current price system p
a, the post-reform equivalent 
income Ye
p would be given by:  
 
Yy p p Y e
p
e
ap = (,, )        (9)  
 
The post-reform equivalent income Ye
p is a monetary assessment of 
utility level Vp Y
p (, )  subsequent to the substitution of the price system p
p 
to the price system p
a.  A natural per equivalent adult welfare measure 
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Also, according to Equation 8, the PL z evaluated under the price 
system p
a corresponding to the equivalent PL ze that allows reaching the 
utility level Vz in the current situation, characterized by the couple (p
a, z), 
and in the post-reform situation, characterized by the couple (p
p, Yz):  
 
Vpz VpY












=       
(11) 
 
where Vz corresponds to the minimum utility level required to be non-poor 
and Yz is the per equivalent adult  PL correponding to the price system p
p.  
If the reform increases the price of some goods, households whose per 
equivalent adult  income is between z and Yz in the current situation will 
become poor people in the post-reform situation, given that the reform 
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The impact of macroeconomic reforms on the welfare of poor 
population may be evaluated by substituting in the retained poverty 
measure FGT Ye and ze to Y and z.
 10   The poverty measure FGT in the 



































o is the number of poor households in the situation o. 
Thus, the analysis of the price system reforms’ effects on the welfare 
of poor population requires the specification of an equivalent income function.  
This function is closely linked to the estimation of a demand system that is 
coherent with the consumer theory.  
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Specification of a Demand System 
 
The specification and estimation of a demand system as much as possible 
in harmony with the economic theory, is an essential element of a welfare 
analysis of the price system reforms’ effects. The problem is that this 
choice can largely predetermine the selection of a fiscal reform (Deaton, 
1988).
12  With the absence of sufficiently long chronological series data on 
consumption at different prices of households in less developed countries 
(LDC), it is hard to estimate a demand system which is not additively 
separable, and the linear expenditure system (LES) hence becomes a 
natural choice.  Nevertheless, for the LES and for all additively separable 
demand systems, income elasticities are approximately proportional to 
price elasticities.  Consequently, goods that have a weak price elasticity and 
which are desirable to tax on efficiency grounds, have equally a weak 
income elasticity and are undesirable to tax on equity grounds (Deaton and 
Muellbauer, 1980b).  Conversely, income elastic goods consumed by the 
non-poor which are natural targets for redistributive taxation, have high 
price elasticities and as a result, high deadweight or efficiency losses.  The 
trade-off between equity and efficiency considerations is then given by a 
uniform tax structure independently of the LES parameters’ estimations.  
The need to use the estimation results to deduce socially optimal reform 
directions has therefore motivated the authors to adopt a more flexible 
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(14) 
 
where wj, pk, p, z(p) and Y are as defined above,  j ϑ  is a residual term and 
the b(p) function is obtained according to the Cobb-Douglas form: 
 
 bp p i
i () = ∏
β
            (15) 
 
The QAIDS system, contrary to the AIDS system of Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980a), allows not only income elasticities to vary with the 
income level, but also a good to be a luxury to some income levels and a 187      A Welfare Analysis of the Price System Reforms  
first necessity good to others.  This will be the case if coefficients β  and δ  
are of opposite signs. 
To a certain extent, the Deaton (1988) and Deaton and Grimard 
methodology (1992) is followed in estimating parameters of the QAIDS 
system.  Statistical information contained under a double dimension to be 
able to develop a panel estimation data is used.  The sample is then 
subdivided into different clusters.  Each cluster contains about 20 
households, characterized by a geographical proximity and surveyed during 
the same period.   Also, as is assumed by Deaton (1988) and Deaton and 
Grimard (1992), households that belong to the same cluster are supposed to 
face the same price system.  The variability between cluster prices is 
justified by a spatial and often a temporal effect.
13  Also, to linearize the 
problem of estimating the parameters of the QAIDS system, it is supposed 
that the PL z(p) and  the function b(p) are exogenous.
14  Under these 




























=+ + + + ++
== =
∑ ωθ β δ µ ϑ ln( ) ln( ) [ln( )]
,... , ,... ,...
2
11 1  
(16) 
 
where Hc is the number of households in the cluster c; D is a vector of 
regional and demographic variables, whose introduction seems very 
relevant given that these variables can influence the consumption levels 
with the classic variables like the price and the income, f
c is a specific fixed 
effect to the cluster
15 and  pk
c is the price of good k that is constant within 
the cluster c and variable between clusters. The equivalent income function 
relative to the QAIDS system is given by this equation:  
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r is as defined above (King, 1983) and the function δ (p) is obtained 
according to the Cobb-Douglas form: 
 
δ
δ () pp i
i = ∏         (18) 
 
However, these prices are not observable.  To bypass this problem, 
the unit value for each good as being expenditure relative to quantity is 188    Building and Sustaining the Capacity for Social Policy Reforms 
used as a price indicator. For each household having consumed good k, it is 
possible to calculate a unit value.
16 
Deaton (1988) has underlined that the unit values variability 
through the sample does not reflect only the spatial and temporal variability 
prices.  It also reflects the quality choice that is itself a function of the price 
system and the income.  Moreover, Deaton has developed a methodology 
which consists in cleaning unit values from qualities’ effects and attributing 
their residual variability to a spatial price.
17   Furthermore, these unit values 
contain measurement errors coming from expenditures or quantities.  Also, 
the use of average unit values as indicator of the price in each cluster is 
found to be reinforced because it allows the reduction of these 
measurement errors’ misdeeds on estimation results.
18   
The first step consists in estimating the income, demographic and 
regional variables’ effects by exploiting the variability within cluster of the 
budgetary equations.  This will be done by applying the ordinary least 
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where I is the identity matrix of order Hc and S is a sum vector also of 
order  Hc; this consists in using deviated variables to their respective 
average in the cluster.
20  It follows that:
21  
 




























This gives the estimate  j β ˆ ,  j δ ˆ  and  j µ ˆ .  The second step consists 
in using the variability between clusters in order to identify prices’ effects.  
To account for measurement errors that may appear in the unit values, the 
instrumental variable method is also applied to the next equation:
22  
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  The Hausman’s specification test (1978) for the presence of 
measurement errors is implemented for each equation.  The statistics of the 
test are as follows: 
 
Κ= − − −
− ($$)'[ $($ )( $)] ($$) θθ θ θ θθ VI VI VI VV
1
    
(22) 
 
where  $, $ ,( $) θθ θ VI V and V VI ($ ) θ  represent respectively the estimations 
of parameters’ prices and their variances-covariances matrix according to 
OLS and instrumental variables methods.
23  Given that estimation results 
are used for fiscal reform analysis, it is necessary to use a demand system 
verifying the restrictions of the consumer theory.  So, it is essential finally 
to impose homogeneity and symmetry constraints to the parameters of price 
effects.
24 
The application field of this method can only be based on food 
goods given that the survey conducted by the National Institute of Statistics 
reports expenditures only for non-food goods.  Also, to insure the system’s 
closure, the non-food budgetary equation has been omitted.  Their 
respective parameters are deduced from constraints of additivity.  The 
estimation of the QAIDS demand system has focused on the whole sample 
to improve the accuracy of the estimations.
25  Nevertheless, the urban - 
rural spatial dualism in the household consumption behavior has been taken 
into account by the specification of own price effects as follows:
26  
 
θθθ ii ii ii
c M =+
01
       (23) 
 
where M
c is a dummy variable that indicates if the region of household 
residence belonging to the cluster c, is urban or rural.
27  
Table 1 presents results of the Hausman’s specification tests 
(1978).  This Table shows that at the traditional threshold of 5% for all 
groups of goods, the presence of measurement errors hypothesis and 
correlation between unit values and the cluster specific effect may be 
rejected.  190    Building and Sustaining the Capacity for Social Policy Reforms 
Table 1    Specification test of Hausman (1978) 
 







Poultry and Eggs 
Milk 
Sugar 






  5.16 
  2.50 
  6.64 
  9.08 
  4.18 
  6.41 
  6.37 
  5.54 
  8.20 
  7.16 
  9.65 
  4.03 
  7.96 
11.75 
  2.19 
 
N.B. The theoretical value of Chi-square is 28.9 when the freedom degree is equal to 18.  
The presence of measurement errors hypothesis in unit values in the budgetary equations 
can be rejected. 
 
Finally, matrix of prices elasticities provided from these estimation 
results are presented in Tables 2 and 3.  These Tables show that all own-
elasticities prices in urban and rural area are, in accordance with the 
economic theory, negative and statistically significant.  The performance of 
the estimation results must be equally considered according to the 
concordance of cross-elasticity signs with the goods nature. It is observed 
that the estimation results substantiate the substitutability between the 
various groups of goods such as cereals groups, olive and mix oils groups, 
and finally between the different proteins products such as meats, fish and 
poultry and eggs groups.  Nevertheless, some inconsistency appears in the 
estimation results.  For example, the negative sign of the cross-elasticity 
between poultry and eggs  and fish  groups or between meat and milk 
groups.
28 191      A Welfare Analysis of the Price System Reforms  
 
INSERT TABLES 2 and 3 HERE 192    Building and Sustaining the Capacity for Social Policy Reforms 193      A Welfare Analysis of the Price System Reforms  
Reform of the Price System and Identification of Target Groups  
 
The impact on poverty of a possible food subsidy  suppression through a 
plausible interval of poverty line and a wide range of poverty measures is 
analyzed.  This hypothetical reform is equivalent for each poor to an income 



















h measures henceforth the per equivalent adult  income loss of 
household h subsequent to the passage from the price system p
a to the price 
system p
p.  The FGT class of poverty measures in the current situation and 
















































































































p represent respectively the number of poor households in 
the current and in the post-reform situation.  Thus, the poverty measure 
variation resulting from the substitution of the price system p
p to p
a is given 
by the following equation: 
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The left part of the equation 27 reflects the increase in the poverty 
measures explained by the well-being deterioration of the population part 
that was and remained poor following this reform.  The right part expresses 
the poverty deterioration due to the increase in the number of poor 
households.     
The food subsidies suppression entails essentially an increase of 
58% of the hard wheat price, 54% of the tender wheat price, 10% of the 
other cereals price, 16% of the poultry and eggs price, 22% of the milk 
price, 32% of the sugar price and 49% of mix oils price.   The reform 
effects on the poor population welfare, for different values of aversion to 
the poverty, are summarized in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4  Welfare impact of the reform on poor population  
 
α   ze  Ρ α (ze, Ye
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This hypothetical reform entails, if no compensation measure is 
taken, an important deterioration of all poverty measures.  A monetary 
evaluation of the welfare deterioration indicates that the per equivalent loss 
(Γ ) per equivalent adult would be equal to 22.2 dinars. This loss 
corresponds on the average to 9.34% of the poor population equivalent 
income.  In addition, the greatest losers from this reform are found among 
the poorest people as is indicated the growing decline of the FGT measure 
when the aversion to poverty increases (Table 4).  
The price system liberalization constitutes for the state a necessary 
option to reduce its budgetary deficit since most studies have shown that in 
nominal terms, food subsidies profit more to the richer people.   In addition, 
these subsidies are a source of economic distortions given the relative 
prices alteration they engender.  This reform has to be accompanied by 
compensation measures to minimize its harmful consequences on the poor 
population.  This compensation, evaluated at the current price system (p
a), 195      A Welfare Analysis of the Price System Reforms  
has to be at least equal to the  equivalent loss per equivalent adult (Γ ). If in 
addition, the state’s objective is to eliminate the poverty problem in the 
post-reform situation, the budget required may be given by Hz Y z eee Ρ 1(,).  
Table 5 gives the budget share relative to the food subsidies budget, 
according to different choice of PLs required to eliminate all poverty in the 
current (B
a) and in the post-reform situation (B
p), if a perfect procedure of 
targeting at no cost can be used to identify the poor from the non-poor 
population. 
 
Table  5  Budget share relative to subsidies budget required to 
eliminate poverty 
 
Actual Situation  Post-reform Situation 
z
a B

















Thus, the state expenditures are considered to correspond 
exclusively to the budget devoted to food subsidies, its expenditures have 
to increase from 17.50 to 50% in the current situation to eliminate totally 
the poverty problem if the targeting cost of poor population is null.  This 
course of action is not foreseeable given the tight budgetary policy which 
has been pursued by the Tunisian government since the adoption of the 
structural adjustment plan in 1986.  On the other hand, the food prices 
liberalization would not only allow the state to have the required resources 
to eliminate poverty, but also help to save 36.8 to 76.43% of the budget 
devoted to food subsidies.  Nevertheless, the success of this economic 
policy depends on the state’s capacity to target perfectly the poor 
population and on the inherent costs of targeting.
30  
It is supposed that government decides to devote a part of the rise 
in its budgetary revenue which has resulted from the food subsidies 
suppression, to a program of poverty alleviation.  Thus, in order to identify 
target groups, the state may proceed to the minimization of the FGT 
poverty measure subject to a budgetary constraint: 
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where Ρ α , Ρ j, α , fj, ze, Ye, ye are as defined above, nj is the individual number 
of subgroups j, Tj is the universal transfer  in subgroup j and B is the budget 
devoted to the poverty alleviation program.  Also, the decomposability of 196    Building and Sustaining the Capacity for Social Policy Reforms 
the FGT poverty measure would allow the identification of the priority 
target groups that must benefit from the budget devoted to the poverty 
alleviation program. Indeed, if the state desires to increase marginally the 
transfer granted to an individual of the subgroup j, the impact of this 
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(29) 
 
Equation 29 shows that if the objective is to minimize Ρ α  at 
national level, groups having a strong contribution to the measure Ρ α -1 have 
to be marginally favored.
31  Table 6 presents the subgroup contribution to 
the poverty according to various regional criteria (rural or urban zone, north 
or south regions...) or socio-demographic criteria (number of child by 
household, the occupation nature of the household head, his/her education 
level...). 
A study of Table 6 shows that poverty is essentially a rural 
phenomenon in Tunisia.  This problem is widespread in the northern 
regions and in West Central Tunisia. The targeting must also be considered 
according to other criteria such as the main occupation of the household 
head and his/her education level.   
If the occupation of the household head is taken into consideration, 
poverty is pervasive among workers in agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors. Targeting according to the main occupation of the household head 
may not altogether be reliable.  Indeed, the poor who have activities in the 
informal sector may not have been included in this survey.  
Finally, if targeting is to be made according to the education level 
of household head, illiterates have to be focused upon. As this population 
group is the largest for all the retained FGT measures, it may be concluded 
that any intervention which succeeds in better targeting, this group may 
entail a sensitive reduction of poverty.   
Nevertheless, the targeting of poor population based on regional 
characteristics or socio-demographic criteria, is not without costs.  Indeed, 
it is not excluded that an important part of the non-poor population is, for 
example, illiterate or residing in the rural zones.  The analysis of the costs 
which result from such risks of errors should precede any proposal aiming 
at the use of these targeting procedures.  197      A Welfare Analysis of the Price System Reforms  
Table 6  Subgroup contribution to poverty 
 





















  6.26 
11.21 
28.15 
  6.11 
20.66 
  5.93 
  10.53 
11.15 
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  7.28 
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  5.44 
  5.51 
10.42 
  4.12 
9.15 
36.15 
  6.04 
25.64 
  5.03 
  4.28 
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  7.73 
  4.85 
Education Illiterate 
Primary 
Secondary 1st cycle 




  3.01 
  0.92 
  0.30 
73.10 
23.17 
  2.85 




  2.72 
  0.43 
  0.21 
 75.81 
 21.13 
   2.58 




Estimation of a Plausible Interval of Poverty Lines   
 
It has been shown that the estimation of QAIDS demand system does not 
allow to deduce a PL if an assessment is not identified beforehand, of the 
parameter ω 0 where this parameter indicates the cost of subsistence if all 
prices are equal to 1.  Banks et al. (1993) propose that this parameter has to 
belong to a plausible interval chosen appropriatly.  The Ravallion method 
(1994) is proposed to be used to estimate this interval. 
It is both natural and convenient to decompose PL in two 
components:  (a) food PL (zf) and (b) non-food PL (znf).  Nutritional 
requirements for good health are the most common approach in defining a 
food PL (Greer and Thorbecke, 1986; Charmes, 1990).  To deduce a food PL 
consistent with the consumer theory, a better method would be to use a 
utilitarian approach.  It is proposed to estimate this component of PL using a 
linear demand system LES.
32  To do this, it is supposed that food goods make 
up a group of goods separable from others.
33  This enables keeping the usage 198    Building and Sustaining the Capacity for Social Policy Reforms 
of the LES model solely for the estimation of the food PL.  Thus, the 















h, zi, zf and σ i are as defined above Yf  is the per equivalent adult  food 
expenditure of household h  and ϑ i
h is a residual term. The estimation results 
of the model (Equation 30) using the ordinary least square (OLS) are given 
in the following Table 7:
34 
 
Table 7  Results of first stage estimation poverty line 
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The non-food PL (znf) is estimated using the Ravallion method 
(1994). It consists of observing households’ behavior whose income is just 
equal to the food PL (Y
h = zf) where zf = Σ zi.  These households are in a 
position to afford basic foodstuffs but prefer to devote part of their income 




zY Y z Y nf
l
ff f =− = −         ( 3 1 )  
 199      A Welfare Analysis of the Price System Reforms  
  To estimate the non-food component of PL, the QAIDS model is used 
representing the food share (wf) as a quadratic function of the total spending 
value per equivalent adult (Y
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Table 8  Results estimation of the food share 
 










The coefficient ω f is an estimated average food share of households 
having an income level equal to the food PL (zf). The lower non-food PL (znf
l
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Equation  33 allows to have a relation between the food PL (zf) and 
the lower PL (z
l) where  z






ff =+ =− () 2 ω




An upper PL (z
u) maybe deduced which is the minimum income level 
required at which a household will be able to devote a budget equal to the 
food PL (zf) for food items.  The upper PL that can be obtained only 
numerically, allows the estimation of an upper non-food PL corresponding to 
the maximum reasonable expenditure for basic non-food items.
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Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper is to propose a methodology, inspired from the 
consumer theory, which would allow the  assessment of the impact of price 
system reforms on the poor’s welfare.  These reforms may come as a result 
of the price system liberalization, fiscal reforms or a suppression of food 
subsidies.  
The analysis of the price system reforms’ impact on the poor 
population addresses an identification and a measure problem.  To 
overcome these problems, an assessment of the effects of price system 
reforms on poverty using a wide range of PLs and measures was done.  The 
estimation of PL was based on a utilitarian approach. On the measure 
problem, the class of FGT poverty measures was used, given that they meet 
minimum requirements of monotonicity, transfer, transfers - sensitivity and 
decomposability.  In addition, poverty measures of King’s (1983) 
equivalent income which is a monetary evaluation of the consumers 
welfare was used.  Thus, the retained poverty measures reflect henceforth 
the social welfare loss resulting from the presence of some people living 
with an income level per equivalent adult under the PL. 
The estimation of a demand system which would be, as much as 
possible, in harmony with the consumer theory has therefore been an 
essential stage in being able to deduce an equivalent income function.   
Also, the QAIDS demand system of Banks et al. (1993) was chosen 
because, compared to the AIDS demand system of Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980a), it allows for a good to be a luxury to some income levels and a 
first necessity to other levels.  The estimation results of the QAIDS model 
carried out on the Tunisian survey, are globally acceptable and in line with 
the economic intuition. 
The estimation results have been used to simulate the welfare 
impact of price system reforms on the poor population.  Dominance tests 
have then been used to evaluate the reforms’ effects on a wide range of PLs 
and measures, encompassing different views on both the selection of the 
poverty measure, and the choice of the PL.  Thus, some ideas from the 
recent literature on welfare modeling on the one hand, and the choice of the 
PLs and measures on the other, were considered. 
This approach has been applied to simulate the impact of a 
hypothetical reform affecting subsidized food prices in Tunisia. The focus 
on subsidies problem is largely explained by their importance on the state’s 
budget and also, by the limited available data that limit the study the 
households’ reaction following prices’ variation of non-food goods. The 
main result of this simulation is that this reform would entail an important 
deterioration of the poor households’ welfare.  This reform therefore, has to 201      A Welfare Analysis of the Price System Reforms  
be accompanied by necessary compensation measures to avoid grave 
deterioration of the poor population’s welfare than the one prevailing 
currently.  It has been verified that the revenue saved by the state as a result 
of this reform, would it make it possible to eliminate all poverty and even 
save from 36.8 to 76.4% of the budget devoted to food subsidies, i.e., if a 
perfect targeting procedure likely to identify the needy groups at no cost, is 
applied.  Targeting using criteria such as the residence area and the 
education level of the household head appear to be the most adequate that 
the state could think of to target its social transfers.  However, it should be 
pointed out that this targeting method is characterized by two error types, 
the costs of which need to be assessed before suggesting an alleviation 
poverty program based on regional or demographic indicators of the poor 
population.
36  The first error type is due to the presence of a non-poor 
group, sharing the same indicator adopted for targeting.  This group will 
take advantage therefore of this program while ideally, it should not be 
doing so. The second error type is explained by the presence of poor 
households which do not show the socio-economic or regional features 
adopted by the targeting procedure.  This group will be deprived from 
benefiting from the alleviation poverty program measures whereas ideally 
it should be.  The assessment of the costs engendered by such errors made 
up the extended investigations of this study.  
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        Table 2   Own-price and cross-price elasticities in the urban area 
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Values between parentheses indicate the t-ratio.  For clarities’ sake, elasticities prices that are significant to the traditiona
presented. 
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        Table 3   Own-price and cross-price elasticities in the rural area 
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1 This study is part of the author’s thesis entitled Public Spending and the Targeting 
Problem of Poor Population.  The author wishes to thank Professor Jean-Yves Duclos of 
Laval University,  Professor Mohamed Goaied of  Faculte des Sciences Economiques et de 
Gestion de Tunis, and his colleague Bechir Bouaicha for their valuable comments.   
2 It is the linear system of expenditure known under the abbreviation LES. 
3 Bibi(1998) estimates equivalence scales using the Engle method followed by Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1986). 
4 Note here that Kanbur et al. (1995) have defended  on the basis of a non-utilitarian 
approach, the idea of basing PL on a basket of reference consumption.  The deprivation 
would be in this case proportional to the distance between the current basket consumption of 
each poor and the basket of reference consumption.  Ravallion and Van de Walle (1991   )  
find it difficult to base PL on a basket of reference consumption.  They argue that even poor 
people make choice of consumption and it is necessary to be prudent before advancing 
judgement on what poor people have to consume. 
5 See appendix of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a). 
6 Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) consider that since ω 0 can be interpreted as the outlay 
required for a minimal living standard (the PL) when all prices are equal to 1, choosing a 
plausible value is not difficult.  Banks et al. (1993) propose that this parameter lies between 204    Building and Sustaining the Capacity for Social Policy Reforms 
                                                                                                                                      
an appropriate interval.  The Ravallion method (1994) is used to estimate this interval.  The 
description of this method figures in the Appendix. 
7 The two first axioms have been developed by Sen (1976), the third by Kakwani (1980) 
and the fourth by Foster et al. (1984). 
8 See the Axiom N of Sen (1976). 
9 The characteristic of any subgroup of poor population may be of regional nature (rural or 
urban zone, northern region or the south...) or socio-demographic (number of child by 
household, the occupation nature of the household head, his/her level of education...).  Note 
that decomposability characteristic of the FGT poverty measure is not always respected in 
all poverty measures suggested in the literature dealing with this subject.  As an example, 
this characteristic is not respected by Sen (1976) or Kakwani (1980) measures.  See Foster et 
al. (1984). 
10 This approach is equally followed by Ravallion and Van de Walle (1991).      
11 The substitution of the equivalent income to the income in the class of poverty measures 
FGT was also done by Besley and Kanbur (1988) to study the impact of infra-marginal 
subsidies’ reforms. 
12 The subsidies reform analysis belongs to the same area of the optimal taxation theory 
given that subsidies are simply negative indirect taxes. 
13 It is useful to point out that several clusters were not investigated during the same period. 
14 To bypass the non-linearity version of the QAIDS model, it is supposed in the first 
iteration that b(p)=1.  Also, it is supposed that z(p)=z where z is estimated following 
Ravallion’s method (1994).  Since this approach gives a range of PL, the robustness of 
coefficients estimated relative to the choice of z is tested.  It is noted that, apart from the 
constants of the model, all coefficients statistically significant are insensitive to the the PL 
choice. 
15 The specific effect to the cluster not measurable in the consumption model, may be 
justified by the regional differences in  the consumption custom. 
16 To respect the constant prices hypothesis within the cluster, the average unit value of the 
cluster for each good i  is taken. 
17 This step has not been adopted in this application since the quality effect that unit values 
can contain, is neglected.  This may not change results of elasticity estimation prices since a 
recent application, developing the procedure of Deaton (1988) on these same data, has 
shown the quasi - absence of the quality effect.  For this subject, see the study of Ayadi et al. 
(1995a). 
18 This affirmation is more legitimate when the number of households in the cluster is high. 
(Hc  →  ∞ ). 
19 It is easy to verify that  QS 0 . 
20 It is clear that the constants variables contribution within cluster, the prices effects, are 
not identifiable in this first step. 
21










the other averages are calculated using the same 
way. 
22 If these two essential components are neglected, elasticity estimations obtained may be 
biased.  Instrument vector is chosen for unit values: t = {ln(Y), demographic, regional and 
temporal indicators variables}. 205      A Welfare Analysis of the Price System Reforms  
                                                                                                                                      
23 This statistics is distributed according to a Chi - square to k freedom degrees, with k as 
the number of instrument variables.  In the absence of quality effect and measurement 
errors, this statistics is close to zero. 
24 If Hausman’s (1978) specification tests are significant for most goods, it is useful to use 
the triple least square under restrictions of homogeneity and the symmetry.  In fact, the 
application of OLS under these restrictions, is sufficient because the test is not significant 
for most of the goods items considered in this study. 
25 This empirical step is more justified in the second step when the estimation of price 
effects is carried out on averages of clusters.  Elsewhere, empirical results confirm it since 
the estimation of Equation 21 on the totality of clusters has improved the accuracy of 
elasticities in comparison to an estimation separated in the urban and rural zone.  In 
addition, the estimation of price effects on the totality of clusters justifies more the thesis of 
the spatial price variation. 
26 This is fundamental to improve food subsidies targeting for poverty alleviation in 
Tunisia.  Indeed, 75% of the 20% of the poorest households live in the rural areas. 
27 During the first step, it was not useful to apply the same procedure for parameters of 
income variables given that income elasticities of the QAIDS system depend on the income 
level of households. 
28 These anomalies appear in the estimation results of Ayadi et al. (1995a) who used the 
same survey. 
29 According to Equation 11, Yz corresponds to the PL in the post-reform situation 
evaluated under the price system Pp.  
30 See Besley and Kanbur (1993). 
31 See Besley and Kanbur (1988). 
32 The linear demand system allows to estimate a poverty line by reference to a fixed 
consumption bundle that is too restrictive.  To reduce disadvantages of the LES choice, the 
poverty line has been decomposed in two components and to use this system only for the 
estimation of food PL. 
33 Ayadi and Matoussi (1995) have followed the nutritional approach to estimate this 
component. Also, they do not consider equivalence scales when estimatig their range of 
poverty lines. 
34 Note that the estimation of the model (30) requires to use a non-linear estimation 
algorithm.  To avoid the complexity of non-linear estimation, an iterative method is 
suggested to estimate this model. 
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what gives an upper poverty line equal to 327.5 dinars per equivalent adult.  Note finally 
that these results are close to those found by Ayadi et al. (1995b). 
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